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The growing importance of private capital flows to
developing countries creates a serious risk of cycli-
cal disturbances to the development process. These
capital flows and especially portfolio investment
can be very volatile. In a period of expansion when
prospects seem rosy, capital inflows can accelerate
beyond the absorptive potential of some countries.
In addition it can then become tempting for gov-
ernments and private firms to borrow in interna-
tional credit markets - sometimes even short-term
and denominated in foreign exchange. In that way
a serious overinvestment situation can develop,
with a large deficit on current account of the
balance of payments.
These risks are different for three forms of capital
movements. They are limited for direct investment.
This can go up and down according to the eco-
nomic prospects of a country and the psychology
of investors. But this capital is invested in real
assets and cannot be withdrawn. Portfolio invest-
ment, which has begun to play an important role,
can be very volatile because of the psychology of
investor expectations. And while individual
investors can withdraw their money, net with-
drawals are only possible in so far as domestic
investors are willing to take over their shares, prob-
ably at lower prices. Thus, an inclination to with-
draw portfolio investment will lead to falling stock
prices but only to a limited extent to net capital
outflows from the country.
The greatest risks for a country are created by
short-term bank loans in foreign currency For,
while borrowers may count - optimistically on
their being renewed, this need not happen. If the
confidence of the banks diminishes, they can
request repayment; this will immediately cause a
net capital outflow on the balance of payments.
The consequence of such a credit crisis and the
most appropriate remedy for it, will depend on
whether the bank loans have mainly been given to
the government or to the private sector. The gov-
ernment sector was the main problem in the Latin
American debt crisis of 1982. The IMF has tackled
this crisis adequately by a combination of adjust-
ment programmes under regular fund drawings
with negotiated loan reschedulings by commercial
banks.
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The present credit crisis in East Asia has a very
different character. It is mainly caused by short-
term bank lending in foreign currency to a large
number of local banks and businesses. These bank
loans served mainly to finance private investment,
not government deficits. It was a situation of over-
investment, stimulated by optimistic expectations
in the climate of rapid economic development.
Such a situation bears the seeds of a crisis in it.
Sooner or later over-optimistic expectations will be
disappointed. Bottlenecks may appear; profit mar-
gins may not come up to expectations; over-opti-
mistic investment projects may fail and - or as a
consequence of some disappointments - capital
inflows will not increase but decrease, so that
exchange rates, which may already have become
somewhat overvalued, come under pressure. This
can then easily undermine investors confidence to
such an extent that foreign investors try to with-
draw some of their money, leading to a stock-mar-
ket crash in addition to the currency crisis. And as
foreign banks will then refuse to renew their short-
term loans, a dramatic liquidity crisis will also
develop with many business failures as a
consequence.
This kind of crisis has the same character as the
classical overinvestment crisis at the upper turning
point of many nineteenth century business cycles in
the industrial countries. But developing countries
run a greater risk in the present financial system.
While in business cycles in the nineteenth century
overinvestment was mainly caused by a large
expansion of internal bank credit,1 some developing
countries now finance their investment boom in
addition through portfolio investment and bank
credit from abroad. These flows originate in
international capital markets that are of enormous
size in comparison to these economies. And besides
the large internal capital markets of the advanced
countries, there is the highly elastic supply of
international credit in the unregulated Euromarket.
(Witteveen 1995, pp.419-431.)
This market, like money-creating banks within a
country, can create additional international liquid-
ity Additional lending can always be financed
through the Eurodollar market because part of it
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will be redeposited automatically, while the rest,
flowing back to the United States, can be attracted
easily to the Eurodollar market by a minimal
increase of interest rates. As I explained earlier, this
lending in the Euromarket will therefore not form a
capital movement out of the United States, but it
will create international credit and liquidity
(Witteveen 1995, pp.423-24). This may have been
an aggravating factor in the present Asian crisis.
All this gives mass-investment psychology
enormous scope to cause inflows and outflows of
capital of a magnitude that can overwhelm com-
pletely the financial systems of these still relatively
small economies. lt goes without saying that cor-
ruption or cronyism in government or in the bank-
ing system greatly increases the risk of
overambitious and failed investments.
The IMF has come in with great courage and
massive financial support to contain and solve the
crisis. But its approach seems to have been ill-fitted
to the particular character of this crisis. It has been
unable to prevent dramatic currency depreciations,
which renders it practically impossible for many
businesses to make the required repayments on
their bank loans, which now need a multiple
amount of local currency The reason is that the IMF
did not see its way to arrange a rescheduling of
bank loans, as they were scattered unclearly over a
large number of borrowers. Neither was the dis-
bursement of the financial support sufficiently
adjusted to the repayment needs of short-term debt
and speculative outflows. The hope was that tough
conditions of fiscal and monetary restraint and
structural improvement in the financial system
would restore market confidence and exchange-rate
stability But instead, market participants were
frightened by the serious recessionary conse-
quences of the liquidity crisis combined with
restrictive ¡MF conditions, In fact, the apparently
unforeseen recessionary consequences of the liquid-
ity crisis became so severe that most of the restric-
tive measures the IMP prescribed were unnecessary
and only worsened the downturn. The result was an
extraordinary fall of exchange rates in the affected
countries, making the liquidity crisis extremely seri-
ous. There was then no alternative to some debt
The crisis of 1873 in the United States was quite because European investors pulled out their money. (C.
similar to the present Asian crisis and very serious J. Bradford, 13 February 1998.)
rescheduling and that was instigated informally by
the Federal Reserve and other central banks.
In this way the crisis is causing a serious recession
or even depression with grave social problems
because of business failures and rising unemploy-
ment. It will take a number of years before eco-
nomic growth can start again. As a consequence,
the convergence of growth between advanced and
developing countries that was just beginning will
probably have to be postponed for a few years.
However, we can hope that the painful IMP
programmes will by then have eliminated serious
weaknesses in the economic and financial systems
of these countries. Greater openness, competition
and integrity, together with an improved quality of
financial services and banking supervision, would
then give better prospects for liealthy and balanced
growth.
The question remains, whether and how such
painful disruptions of the development process can
be prevented or limited in the future. Such ques-
tions are now being explored and debated in differ-
ent official gremia. One proposal is to improve
information. This is the easiest approach; but a
great deal of information has already been available.
Alexander Lamfalussy noted that BIS data had sig-
nalled fully the worrisome increase of short-term
debt in Asia; but these published warnings from the
BIS were ignored (Lamfalussy, International Herald
Tribune, 16 February 1998).
Nevertheless, there seems to have been confusion
about the total short-term debt of particular coun-
tries. The figure that would be essential in this
respect is net short-term foreign exchange debt of a
country compared to its foreign exchange reserves.
Comprehensive figures for this magnitude should
be calculated by all central banks and made pub-
licly available.
But, then, if - notwithstanding this information
- warnings are ignored and short-term lending con-
tinues to grow dangerously, restrictive monetary
policies should be focussed on these specific credit
flows. This could be done on both sides: in the
receiving and in the source countries. Central banks
in the receiving countries affected by the crisis
could, for example, impose non-interest-bearing
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foreign exchange deposits with the central bank on
additional borrowing. At the same time monetary
policy should become generally restrictive and part
of the capital inflow should be sterilised. On the
other side, central banks in source countries could
impose such foreign exchange deposits on further
lending to the risk countries. These restraining
monetary policies should be internationally coordi-
nated by the IMF and BiS. Such a cooperation could
create a nucleus for a more systematic surveillance
system for international liquidity, where the focus
would become more global: i.e. the total increase of
international credit and liquidity This will become
increasingly desirable. As I argued earlier, the cen-
tral banks' exclusive focus on their own money
supplies is no longer sufficient in our internation-
ally integrated financial markets (Witteveen 1995,
pp.429-30).
Finally we can ask what the best approach would be
if a similar crisis were to develop in future, notwith-
standing warnings and restraining policies. Two
questions arise here:
1. Should the IMF be able to act more forcefully
against speculative capital outflows? We have
seen how seriously exaggerated depreciations of
a currency can dislocate the economic and finan-
cial system. To counter speculative outflows and
maintain the exchange rate within a reasonable
range a larger part of the IMFs financial support
should be available on a sufficiently large scale
immediately - and not meted out gradually in
successive instalments. This could to some
extent diminish the power of the IMF to enforce
correct performance under its conditions. But in
those cases where the problem emerges through
capital outflows, there is less need for restrictive
measures. With respect to structural problems,
conditionality should still be required; and part
of the financial assistance should still be dis-
bursed over time under performance criteria.
Exchange rates should be a central concern of
the IMP in recent developments the stability of
exchange rates seems to have received
insufficient attention.
2 Problems of short-term bank loan repayments
should be tackled at the same time. The interna-
tional financial community could design an
internationally accepted rescheduling mecha-
nism - also for private bank debt - under IMF
guidance and related to IMP programmes. Such
a mechanism would provide essential help in
preventing a melt-down in currency markets,
while limiting the amount of financial assistance
that would have to be made available by the IMP
It would also lead to a more equitable distribu-
tion of pain among debtors and creditors which
would at the same time remove or reduce moral
hazard. In this field, the global economy
demands the creation of international institu-
tions, comparable to those that we have inside
countries. There are essential tasks here for
international monetary cooperation. Further
healthy growth in the global economy will be
more and more dependent on this cooperation.
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